THE CASE OF BELGIUM

In the Light of Official Reports found in the Secret Archives of the Belgian Government after the Occupation of Brussels

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WITH FACSIMILES OF THE DOCUMENTS

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REMARKS INTRODUCTORY TO THE SECRET DOCUMENTS

By Dr. Bernhard Dernburg

HEREWITH are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements between the English Military Attaché and the Belgian Minister of War regarding British intervention in Belgium.

It will be remembered from the British White Book that in November, 1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on August 2 that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into the channel, England would give all the assistance in her power (British White Papers No. 148), and it was also, of course, concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey on August 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey McDonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.

Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not back out.

The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of three French ports—viz., Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne—and that the British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus violating also Dutch neutrality.

The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from 1906.

The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well known Belgian patriot, protested to his government. The heading of his protest is also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by the words of Colonel Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for transporting troops into Belgium.

Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in 1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British went one step further. When Colonel Bridges, in a conversation with General Jungbluth, the chief of the Belgian general staff, said that England was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break out, General Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it, but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect herself, England would land troops anyway. General Jungbluth answered that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British White Book. The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had already concerted

plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.

Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation—which I hoped would continue—into thinking that we should stand aside." (British White Papers, No. 89.)

This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all. It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British White Book, prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on August 1, 1914, as reported in the English White Book, No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that he could not say that.

It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of a German war that was sure to be brought about by Russia's mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany, and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war (see report of Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Brussels July 30).

In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been made in 1912 or any time thereafter until August 4 in the German Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized, Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England and that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at Liège that put this important railway center commanding the railway connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the English landing and invading Belgium.

The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be presumed that the conference between British and French experts was unknown to the British Military Attaché in Brussels. It is furthermore impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of British troops from Calais, Dunkirk and Boulogne into Belgium in Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.

The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans against the French and the English, and the truth had become known only three full months later, when the Belgian Gray Book was published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken down diplomacy.

The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he had to regret that it violated international law. This law of necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, volume 130, page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived without deeply affecting its independence."

We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.

SUMMARY OF THE SECRET DOCUMENTS

I. The first document is a report of the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarme, to the Minister of War, reporting a series of conversations which he had had with the Military Attaché of the British Legation, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, in Brussels. It discloses that, as early as January, 1906, the Belgian Government was in consultation with the British Government over steps to be taken by Belgium, Great Britain and France against Germany. A plan had been fully elaborated for the landing of two British army corps in French ports to be transferred to the point in Belgium necessary for operations against the Germans. Throughout the conversation the British and Belgian forces were spoken of as "allied armies"; the British Military Attaché insisted on discussing the question of the chief command; and he urged the establishment, in the meantime, of a Belgian spy system in Germany.

II. When in the year 1912 Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston had been succeeded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges as British Military Attaché in Brussels, and the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarme, had been succeeded by General Jungbluth as Chief of the Belgian General Staff, the conversations proceeded between the two latter officials. That is to say, these were not casual conversations between individuals, but a series of official conversations between representatives of their respective governments, in pursuance of a well-considered policy on the part of both governments.

III. The above documents are given additional significance by a report made in 1911 by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, from which it appears that this representative of the Belgian Government in Berlin was familiar with the plans above set forth and protested against them, asking why like preparations had not been made with Germany to repel invasion by the French and English.

Taken together, these documents show that *the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, of sending troops into Belgium immediately—that is, of doing the very thing which, done by Germany, was used by England as a pretext for declaring war on Germany.*

They show also that the Belgian Government took, in agreement with the English General Staff, military precautions against a hypothetical German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government, military precautions against an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium, though fully informed that it was the purpose of the British Government to land and dispatch, across French territory into Belgium, 160,000 troops, without asking Belgium's permission, on the first outbreak of the European war. *This clearly demonstrates that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies.*



[Inscription on the cover of General Ducarme's Report]

DOCUMENT NO. 1

Report of General Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the Belgian Minister of War

"Confidential

"Letter to the Minister
"Concerning the Confidential Conversations

"Brussels, April 10, 1906.

"Mr. Minister:

"I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations which I had with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and which have already been the subject of my oral communications.

"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with regard to the general political situation, and because of the possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.

"The Lieutenant-Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.

"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and because on the other hand the safety would be less complete.

"This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of the allied forces.

"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of the English troops—which he estimated to last about ten days.

"I answered him that the places Namur and Liége were protected from a "coup de main" and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable of intervention within four days.

"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) that our conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on his government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he and

Confidentielle.

Lettre à Monsieur le Ministre
au sujet des entretiens confidentiels.

Bruxelles, le 10 avril 1906.

Monsieur le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston et qui ont fait l'objet de mes communications verbales.

La première visite date de la mi-janvier. Monsieur Barnardiston me fit part des préoccupations de l'état-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Un envoi de troupes, d'un total de 100,000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

Le Lieutenant Colonel m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interpretée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention relevait également du pouvoir politique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la guerre.

Monsieur Barnardiston me répondit que son ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Ministre des affaires étrangères.

Il continua dans ce sens: Le débarquement des troupes anglaises se ferait sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à hâter le plus possible le mouvement. (L'entrée des Anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne.) Le débarquement par Anvers demanderait beaucoup plus de temps parcequ'il faudrait des transports plus considerables et, d'autre part, la sécurité serait moins complète.

Ceci admis, il resterait à régler divers autres points, savoir: les transports par chemin de fer, la question des requisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement supérieur des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si nos dispositions étaient suffisantes pour assurer la défense du pays durant la traversée et les transports des troupes anglaises, temps qu'il évaluait à une dizaine de jours.

Je répondis que les places de Namur et de Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, en 4 jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100,000 hommes, serait en état d'intervenir.

Après avoir exprimé toute sa satisfaction au sujet de mes déclarations, mon interlocuteur insista sur le fait que 1°) notre conversation était absolument confidentielle; 2°) elle ne pouvait lier son gouvernement; 3°) son Ministre, l'Etat-Major Général anglais, lui et moi

DOCUMENT NO. 1

Lettre à Mr le Ministre
au sujet des entretiens confidentiels

Confidentielle

Bruxelles, le 10 avril 1906

Mr le Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rendre compte sommairement des entretiens que j'ai eus avec le Lt. Barmentlotten et qui ont fait depuis l'objet de nos communications verbales.

La première visite date de la mi-janvier. Mr Barmentlotten me fit part des préoccupations de l'Etat-major de son pays relativement à la situation politique générale et aux éventualités de guerre du moment. Les envois de troupes, d'un total de 100.000 hommes environ, était projeté pour le cas où la Belgique serait attaquée.

Le Lt. m'ayant demandé comment cette action serait interprétée par nous, je lui répondis que, au point de vue militaire, elle ne pourrait qu'être favorable; mais que cette question d'intervention ~~serait~~ également de humanité publique et que, dès lors, j'étais tenu d'en entretenir le Ministre de la guerre.

Mr Barmentlotten me répondit que son ministre à Bruxelles en parlerait à notre Min. des aff. ét.

Il continua dans ce sens: Le débarq.t des deux troupes (anglaise) française sur la côte de France, vers Dunkerque et Calais, de façon à gêner le plus possible le mouvement. Le débarq.t par d'autres demandera beaucoup plus de temps parce qu'il faudrait disposer de transports plus considérables et que l'action serait moins complète.

Le l'entente des anglais en Belgique ne se ferait qu'après la violation de notre neutralité par l'Allemagne.

Ceci admis, il restait à régler divers autres points, savoir: les transports par Ch. de fer, la question des réquisitions auxquelles l'armée anglaise pourrait avoir recours, la question du commandement Sup.r des forces alliées.

Il s'informa si pendant le temps des transports, nos dispositions étaient ~~jugées~~ suffisantes pour assurer la défense des pays durant la traversée et le transport des troupes anglaises, ~~et~~ temps qu'il évaluait à une dizaine de jours.

Je répondis que les places de Namur et de Liège étaient à l'abri d'un coup de main et que, en 4 jours, notre armée de campagne, forte de 100.000 hommes, serait en état d'entrer en ~~ligne~~ — ce qui lui donne complet ~~suffisant~~

Mr le Ministre de la guerre

I were, up to the present, the only ones* informed about the matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his Sovereign has been consulted.

* * *

"In a following discussion Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston assured me that he had never received confidential reports of the other military attachés about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English forces; we could depend on it, that in 12 or 13 days 2 army corps, 4 cavalry brigades and 2 brigades of horse infantry would be landed.

"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the landing army.

"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from this army to Namur and Liége, because these places were provided with garrisons of sufficient strength.

"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the English army the advantages which the regulations concerning the military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the question of the chief command.

"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last point and promised him that I would study the other questions carefully.

* * *

"Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former calculations: 12 days would at least be necessary to carry out the landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time (1 to 2½ months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.

"Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and that it would be better to proceed with these, as when the troops arrived at the coast, Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.

"As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this question could be easily regulated.

* * *

"The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that one-half of the English army could be landed within 8 days; the rest at the conclusion of the 12th or 13th day, with the exception of the Horse Infantry, which could not be counted upon until later.

"In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to regulate the railway transportation for every day.

étions seuls, en ce moment, dans la confidence; 4°) il ignorait si son souverain avait été pressenti.

* * *

Dans un entretien subséquant, le Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait jamais reçu de confidences d'autres attachés militaires au sujet de notre armée. Il précisa ensuite les données numérique concernant les forces anglaises; nous pouvions compter que, en 12 ou 13 jours, seraient débarqués: 2 corps d'armée, 4 brigades de cavallerie et 2 brigades d'infanterie montée.

Il me demanda d'examiner la question du transport de ces forces vers la partie du pays ou elles seraient utiles et, dans ce but, il me promit la composition détaillée de l'armee de débarquement.

Il revint sur la question des effectifs de notre armée de campagne en insistant pour qu'on ne fît pas de détachements de cette armée à Namur et à Liège, puisque ces places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de fixer mon attention sur la nécessité de permettre à l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des avantages prévus par le Règlement sur les prestations militaires. Enfin il insista sur la question du commandement suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais rien dire quant à ce dernier point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions.

* * *

Plus tard, l'attaché militaire anglais confirma son estimation précédente: 12 jours seraient au moins indispensables pour faire le débarquement sur la côte de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (1 à 2½ mois) pour débarquer 100,000 hommes à Anvers.

Sur mon objection qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement du débarquement pour commencer les transports par chemin de fer et qu'il valait mieux les faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages à la côte, le Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston me promit des données exactes sur l'état journalier du débarquement.

Quant aux prestations militaires, je fis part à mon interlocuteur que cette question serait facilement réglée.

* * *

A mesure que les études de l'état-major anglais avançaient, les données du problème se précisaient. Le Colonel m'assura que la moitié de l'armée anglaise pourrait être débarquée en 8 jours, et que le restant le serait à la fin du 12e ou 13e jour, sauf l'infanterie montée sur laquelle il ne fallait compter que plus tard.

Néanmoins, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité de connaître le rendement journalier, de façon à régler les transports par chemin de fer de chaque jour.

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*This is similar to the manner in which the English Entente with France was arranged. The British Parliament and the British Cabinet were kept in igorance of the fact that English and French Naval experts were consulting together. The British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, repeatedly assured the country that Great Britain's hands were free. Yet when the crisis came, this quite unofficial exchange of military views and plans, this mere gentleman's agreement, revealed itself, of course, as a binding obligation. Nations do not reveal their military secrets to each other except on the clear understanding that an alliance is in force.

Après avoir examiné toute la satisfaction au sujet de ma déclaration
Lamme guilleaume, mon interlocuteur insista sur le fait que : 1° notre conversation
était absolument confid.le ; 2°) l'Ex. ne pourrait lire son journ.l ; 3°) elle demeurerait
d'Ex. 1re anglaise, car : et moi étions seuls, sur le moment, dans la confidence ; 4°) il
ignorait si son souverain avait été prévenu.

X

Alors son entretien subséquent, le Lt. Barnardiston m'assura qu'il n'avait
jamais eu de confidences d'autres attachés mil.res au sujet de notre dernière
Il précisa ensuite les besoins numériques de notre armée anglaise ; nous pourrions
compter que, en 12 ou 13 jours, serions débarqués : 2 corps d'armée, 4 brig. de
cav.ie et 2 brig. d'inf.ie motorisé.

Il me demanda d'examiner la question du transport de ces forces vers
la partie du pays où elles seraient utiles et, dans ce but, il me promit la
Correspondance détaillée de l'armée de débarq.t.

Il revint sur la question des effs. de notre armée de campagne en insistant
pour qu'on ne fît pas de détach.ts de cette armée à Namur et à Liège, puisque
ces places étaient pourvues de garnisons suffisantes.

Il me demanda de faire mon attention sur la nécessité de permettre à
l'armée anglaise de bénéficier des avantages prévus par le Règl.t sur les
prestations mil.res. Enfin, il insista sur la question du commandement
suprême.

Je lui répondis que je ne pouvais rien répondre quant à ce dernier
point, et je lui promis un examen attentif des autres questions.

X

Plus tard, l'attaché mil.re anglais confirma son entretien précédent ;
12 jours seraient un minimum indispensable pour faire le débarquement sur
la côte de France. Il faudrait beaucoup plus (10 à 12 jours) pour débarquer
100.000 h.es à Anvers.

Sur mon observation qu'il était inutile d'attendre l'achèvement du débarq.t
pour commencer les transports par Ch.s de fer et qu'il valait mieux les
faire au fur et à mesure des arrivages à la côte, le Lt. Barnardiston me
promit des données exactes sur l'état journalier du débarq.t.

Quant aux prestations mil.res, je fis part à mon interlocuteur que
~~bien que le Règl. fût muet pour les prestations des troupes alliées~~,
cette question serait facilement réglée.

X

A mesure que les études de l'état-major anglais avanceraient, les
détails du problème de transport. Le Colonel m'assura que l'armée
anglaise pourrait être débarquée en 8 jours, et la restante le deuxième
à la fin du 12e ou 13e jour ; sauf l'unité montée (Life Guards) qu'il
en fallait compter que plus tard.

Néanmoins, je crus devoir insister à nouveau sur la nécessité
de connaître le renseignement journalier, de façon à régler les
transports journaliers par Ch.s de fer de chaque jour.

"The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other questions, namely:

"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding strict secrecy from the Press;

"(2) The advantages, which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the British police troops.

* * *

"In the course of another interview Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston and I studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the German troops marching through our country in order to reach the French Ardennes.

"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval of General Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.

"Other secondary questions which were likewise settled, had particular reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps, photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English, of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of the allied armies, etc. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity which the Government or the Military authorities might exert on the Press.

* * *

"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily disembarked at Boulogne, Calais and Cherbourg. The distance of the last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will involve a certain delay. The first Corps would be disembarked on the 10th day, and the second on the 15th day. Our railways would carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first Corps, either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would be assured on the 11th day, and that of the second on the 16th day.

"I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on the necessity of hastening the sea-transports so that the English troops could be with us between the 11th and 12th day. The happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Colonel Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be done.

* * *

"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp from the beginning.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended to transfer

L'attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses autres questions, savoir:

1°) nécessité de tenir le secret des opérations et d'obtenir de la presse qu'elle l'observât soigneusement;

2°) avantages qu'il y aurait à adjoindre un officier belge à chaque état-major anglais, un traducteur à chaque commandant de troupes, des gendarmes à chaque unité pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

* * *

Dans une autre entrevue, le Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston et moi examinâmes les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne ayant comme objectif Anvers et dans l'hypothèse d'une traversée de notre pays pour atteindre les Ardennes françaises.

Par la suite le Colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'assura de l'assentiment du Général Grierson, chef de l'Etat-Major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les officiers intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniforms, les tirés à part traduits en anglais de certains règlements belges, le règlement des frais de douane pour les approvisionnements anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, etc. Rien ne fut arrêté quant à l'action que pourrait exercer sur la presse le gouvernement ou l'autorité militaire.

* * *

Dans les dernières rencontres que j'ai eues avec l'attaché anglais, il me communiqua le rendement journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'éloignement de ce dernier point, imposé par des considérations d'ordre technique, occasionne un certain retard. Le 1er Corps serait débarqué le 10e jour, et le 2e Corps le 15e jour. Notre matériel des chemins de fer exécuterait les transports, de sorte que l'arrivée, soit vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Dinant, du 1er Corps serait assurée le 11e jour, et celle du 2e Corps, le 16e jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi énergiquement que je le pouvais, sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports maritimes de façon que les troupes anglaises fûrent près de nous entre le 11e et le 12e jour; les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables peuvent être obtenus par une action convergente et simultanée des forces alliées. Au contraire, ce sera un échec grave si cet accord ne se produit pas. Le Colonel Barnardiston m'a assuré que tout serait fait dans ce but.

* * *

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eu l'occasion de convaincre l'attaché militaire anglais de la volonté que nous avions d'entraver, dans la limite du possible, les mouvements de l'ennemi et de ne pas nous refugier, dès le début, dans Anvers.

De son côté, le Lieutenant Colonel Barnardiston me fit part de son peu de confiance actuellement dans l'appui ou l'intervention de la Hollande. Il me confia également que son gouvernement projetait de transporter la base

L'Attaché anglais m'entretint ensuite de diverses questions, devant avoir :

1°) m'informer de tenir le secret des opérations et d'abstenir de la presse ce qu'elle n'observât soigneusement ;

2°) Aranger que il y eut à adjoindre aux off. belges à chaque état-major anglais, aux traducteurs à chaque commandement de troupes, des gendarmes à chaque unité pour aider les troupes de police anglaises.

X

Dans une autre entrevue, le L.C. Barnardiston et moi examinâmes les opérations combinées dans le cas d'une agression de la part de l'Allemagne comme objectif ancien et dans l'hypothèse d'une intervention de notre pays pour atteindre les Ardennes françaises.

Sur la suite le Colonel me marqua son accord sur le plan que je lui avais présenté et m'assura de l'assentiment du Gen.al Gellibrand, chef de l'Etat-major anglais.

D'autres questions secondaires furent également réglées, notamment en ce qui regarde les off. intermédiaires, les traducteurs, les gendarmes, les cartes, les albums des uniformes, les titres à faire traduire en anglais de certains règlements belges, etc. le règlement des frais de séjour pour les officiers anglais, l'hospitalisation des blessés de l'armée alliée, etc. Rien ne fut

X

Dans les dernières rencontres que j'ai eues avec l'Attaché anglais, il me communiqua le résumé journalier des débarquements à Boulogne, Calais et Cherbourg. L'éloignement de ce dernier port, imposé par des considérations d'ordre technique, retarda sensiblement quelque peu le débarquement. Le I.er C. devait débarquer le 10e jour, le II.e C. le 15e jour.

Notre souhait des Ch. de fer exécuteurs les transports, de sorte que l'arrivée, soit vers Bruxelles-Louvain, soit vers Namur-Briana, du I.er Corps devait avoir lieu le 11e jour, celle des II.e Corps, le 16e jour.

J'ai insisté une dernière fois et aussi vivement que je le pouvais sur la nécessité de hâter encore les transports de façon que les troupes anglaises fussent prêtes de mon côté le 11e et le 12e jour. Les résultats les plus heureux, les plus favorables peuvent être obtenus par une action concertée et simultanée des forces alliées. Au contraire, ce sera un échec grave si cet accord ne se produit pas. Le Col. Barnardiston m'a assuré que toute avance fait dans ce but.

X

Au cours de nos entretiens, j'eus l'occasion de remarquer l'attaché militaire anglais [illegible] la volonté que nous avions d'observer, dans la limite du possible, les mesures de l'ennemi et de nous opposer par une résistance, dès le début, dans Anvers.

De son côté, le Col. Barnardiston me fit part de tout son désir de connaître définitivement l'appui ou l'intervention de la Hollande. Il me confia également que leurs grands projets de transports

avait grand à l'archiviste que pourrais mener sur la presse le gouvernement ou l'autorité mil.re.

the basis of the British commissariat from the French coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North Sea.

* * *

"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the situation of our Eastern neighbors, etc. At the same time he emphasized that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I had to admit that with us the surveillance-service abroad was, in times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our Legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed in our regulations, was in working order or not. But I consider it my duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.

"Major-General, Chief of the General Staff.
(Initials of Gen. Ducarme.)

d'approvisionnement anglaise de la côte française à Anvers, dès que la mer du Nord serait nettoyée de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

* * *

Dans tous nos entretiens, le Colonel me communiqua régulièrement les renseignements confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état militaire et la situation de nos voisins de l'Est, etc. En même temps il insista sur la nécessité impérieuse pour la Belgique de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans les pays Rhénans qui nous avoisinent. Je dus lui confesser que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière, en temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major; nous n'avons pas d'attachés militaires auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service d'espionage, qui est prescrit par nos règlements. était ou non preparé. Mais il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-vis de nos voisins, nos ennemis éventuels.

Le Général major, chef des Corps d'Etat-Major.
(Parafe du Général Ducarme.)

"Note. When I met General Grierson at Compiegne, during the manœuvres of 1906, he assured me the result of the re-organization of the English army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that, moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has been assumed above.

"Concluded September, 1906."
(Initials of General Ducarme.)

Note. Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grierson à Compiègne, pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'assura que la réorganisation d l'armée anglaise aurait pour résultat, non seulement d'assurer le débarquement de 150,000 hommes, mais de permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédemment.

Fini septembre, 1906.
(Parafe du Général Ducarme.)

La base d'appui anglaise
de la côte française à Ostende, dès que la mer du Nord aura été déblayée de tous les navires de guerre allemands.

Dans nos entretiens, le Colonel ~~me fit part de~~ me communiqua également des renseignements confidentiels qu'il possédait sur l'état ~~des garnisons allemandes, sur la situation~~ de la défense côtière et la situation générale de l'Allemagne. Les mêmes temps, il insista sur la nécessité impérieuse pour la Belg. de se tenir au courant de ce qui se passait dans les pays limitrophes qui nous avoisinent. Je lui exposai que, chez nous, le service de surveillance au delà de la frontière, en temps de paix, ne relève pas directement de notre état-major; ~~il~~ nous n'avons pas d'attachés mil.res auprès de nos légations. Je me gardai bien, cependant, de lui avouer que j'ignorais si le service d'espionnage, qui existait, était prêt ou non préparé. Mais il est de mon devoir de signaler ici cette situation qui nous met en état d'infériorité flagrante vis-à-vis de nos voisins, nos communs ennemis éventuels.

Le Gal Ruquoy, Chef des Corps d'Et.

Note Lorsque je rencontrai le Général Grierson à Compiègne, pendant les manœuvres de 1906, il m'assura que les livraisons de l'armée anglaise auraient pour résultat, non seulement d'assurer le débarq.t de 150.000 h.s, mais de permettre leur action dans un délai plus court que celui dont il est question précédt.

Juin septbre 1906

DOCUMENT NO. 2

Minutes of a Conference Between the Belgian Chief of the General Staff, General Jungbluth, and the British Military Attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges

(Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, British Military Attaché in Brussels, was succeeded in his office by Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges. Likewise, General Ducarme was succeeded, as Chief of the Belgian Staff, by General Jungbluth. A conversation between Colonel Bridges and General Jungbluth was committed to writing, and that writing was also found at the Belgian Foreign Office. The document, which is dated April 23rd and is presumed to belong to the year 1912, is marked "confidentielle" in the handwriting of Graf v.d. Straaten, the Belgian Foreign Secretary. This is the translation:)

"Confidential

"The British Military Attaché asked to see General Jungbluth. The two gentlemen met on April 23rd.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the General that England had at her disposal an army which could be sent to the Continent, composed of six divisions of infantry and eight brigades of cavalry—together 160,000 troops. She has also everything which is necessary for her to defend her insular territory. Everything is ready.

"At the time of the recent events, the British Government would have immediately effected a disembarkment in Belgium (chez nous), even if we had not asked for assistance.

"The General objected that for that our consent was necessary.

"The Military Attaché answered that he knew this, but that—since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country—England would have landed her troops in Belgium under all circumstances (en tout état de cause).

"As for the place of landing, the Military Attaché did not make a precise statement; he said that the coast was rather long, but the General knows that Mr. Bridges, during Easter, has paid daily visits to Zeebrugge from Ostende.

"The General added that we were, besides, perfectly able to prevent the Germans from passing through."

DOCUMENT NO. 3

Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs

(On the 23rd of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report; although a copy, the official character of this third document found in Brussels is evident from the official imprint on the paper on which the copy stands. The first page reads:)

.....SECTION
No.....
.....ENCLOSURE
Reply to No.
General Department
Office of.....

COPY.

Berlin, December 23, 1911.

Belgian Legation,
No. 3022—1626.

Strictly Confidential.

What is Belgium to do in case of war?

Mr. Minister:

I have had the honour to receive the dispatch of the 27 November last, P without docket-number, registration number 1108,

Confidentielle

DOCUMENT NO. 2

L'Attaché lilitaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth.Ces Messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant Colonel Bridges a dit au Général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent,composée de six divisions d'infanterie et de huit brigades de cavalerie-en tout 160.000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territaire insulaire.Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique ,lors des derniers évènements,aurait débarqué immédiatement chez nous,même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le Général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'Attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous,l'Angletarre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement,l'Attaché militaire n'a pas précisé;il a dit que la côte était assez longue,mais le Général sait que M.Bridges a fait,d'Ostende des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le Général a ajouté que nous étions, d'ailleurs, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

DOCUMENT NO. 3


SECTION
N°
ANNEXE
Réponse au N°
Dion Gle Beau
du

Copie.

Berlin, le 23 Décembre 1911

Legation de Belgique.
N° 3022/1626

Très Confidentielle

Que fera la Belgique en cas de guerre?

Monsieur le Ministre.

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir la dépêche du 27 novem.
Ire Direction, P. Sans numéro de dossier, n° d'ordre 1108,

Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it were published in the North German Gazette of October 13th. A facsimile has been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great length.

The writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives underlying the English proposal and draws attention to the danger of the situation in which Belgium had become involved by a one-sided partisanship in favor of the Powers of the Entente. In this very detailed report, dated Dec. 23, 1911, Baron Greindl explains that the plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of Belgian neutrality in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only concerned the question as to what military measures should be adopted in case Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probability in itself. The diplomat then goes on in the following manner:

"From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of Luxemburg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence of it.

"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms part of the scheme of the 'Entente Cordiale.' If that were not the case, then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia, and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be difficult, for, after the surrender of our national center of refuge, we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Colonel Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the 'Entente Cordiale,' which were just as perfidious as they were naive, have

shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British army was not to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.

"The revelations of Captain Faber, which were denied as little as the newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several respects, also testify to this. This British army, at Calais and Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longway in order to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest. That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations immediately, to encounter the Belgian army in a region where we could not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle. Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of England and her allies.

"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the Belgian army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and France."

COMMENT ON THE DOCUMENTS

By the *North German Gazette*

The British Government has confined its answer to our revelations from the archives of the Belgian Ministry of War, concerning the Anglo-Belgian military agreements in 1906, to the explanation that Major-General Grierson, who took part in their formulation, had died, and that Colonel Barnardiston was away as Chief of the English troops before Kiaochow and that it might be that an academic discussion had taken place between those two British Officers and the Belgian Military Authorities as to the assistance which the British army would be able to give to Belgium in case her neutrality were violated by one of her neighbors.

The Belgian Government has remarked that it could only be considered as natural that the English Military Attaché in Brussels. should during the Algeciras crisis have asked the Chief of the Belgian General Staff about the measures which were to prevent the violation of Belgian neutrality guaranteed by England. The Chief of the General Staff, General Ducarme, had answered, that Belgium would be capable of warding off an attack no matter from which side it might come. The Belgian Government adds to this the following remark: "Did the conversation exceed these limits, and did Colonel Barnardiston explain the war plan which the British General Staff wished to follow in case this neutrality should be violated? We doubt it." Demanding the unabridged publication of the material found in the Belgian secret archives, the Belgian Government makes the solemn assertion that it was never asked directly or indirectly to take sides with the Triple Entente in case of a Franco-German war.

As may be seen from these declarations, the British Government from the beginning has failed to dispute the statements of the Imperial Government. It has limited itself to minimizing them. It perhaps told itself that, owing to the overwhelming abundance of evidence, a denial of the facts would be useless and risky. The unveiling, in the meantime, of an Anglo-Belgian military news service and the discovery of Belgian war maps prepared by the British Authorities prove anew how far the preparations for the Anglo-Belgian war plan against Germany had proceeded.

Here it is plainly stated that the British Government had the intention, in case of a Franco-German war, to send troops to Belgium immediately, that is to say, to violate Belgian neutrality and do the very thing which England at the time when Germany, justified by reasons of self-protection, anticipated her, used as a pretext for declaring war on Germany. Moreover, the British Government, with a cynicism that is unparalleled in history, has taken advantage of Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality for the purpose of raising sentiment against us all over the world and of posing as the protector of the small and feeble powers.

As regards the Belgian Government, it was its duty

not only to reject most emphatically the English insinuations, but also to point out to the other signatories of the London Protocol of 1839 and especially to the German Government that England had repeatedly tempted Belgium to disregard the duties incumbent upon her as a neutral Power. The Belgian Government, however, did not do so. That Government considered itself justified and bound to take, in agreement with the English General Staff, military precautions against the supposed plan of a German invasion of Belgium. On the other hand, the Belgian Government has never made the slightest attempt to take, in agreement with the German Government or the military authorities of Germany, defensive measures against the possibility of an Anglo-French invasion of Belgium. Yet the documentary evidence which has been found, proves that Belgium was fully informed that such an invasion was in the intentions of the two Entente Powers. *This shows that the Belgian Government was determined from the outset to join Germany's enemies and make common cause with them.*

The above exposition convincingly proves the fact that the same England which is now posing as the protector of Belgian neutrality forced Belgium to a one-sided partisanship in favor of the Powers of the Entente, and that she at one time even thought of a violation of the neutrality of Holland. It is, furthermore, clear that the Belgian Government, by lending an ear to the English whisperings, is guilty of a severe violation of the duties incumbent upon it as a neutral power. The right fulfillment of these duties would have compelled the Belgian Government to foresee in her plans for defense the violation of Belgian neutrality by France and to conclude with Germany agreements analogous to those concluded with France and, for this eventuality, England. The discovered official papers constitute a documentary proof of the fact, well known to competent German authorities long before the outbreak of the war, that Belgium connived with the Powers of the Entente. They serve as a justification for our military procedure and as a confirmation of the information obtained by the German military authorities about France's intentions. They may open the eyes of the Belgian people with regard to the question to whom it is they owe the catastrophe which has swept over the unfortunate country.

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